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Santiago Echeverri 
Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience  
 
In the last few years, some philosophers have insisted that an adequate account of knowledge 
should conceive of subjects as responsible beings. Epistemic responsibility is usually related 
to the capacity to engage in adequate policies in the search of truth, the ability to give reasons, 
or the readiness to revise one’s beliefs in the light of new evidence. These ideas are in line 
with the complaint that a crude externalism about knowledge cannot be right.1 
If one assumes that perceptual experience offers a primary source of knowledge, the above 
requirement takes the form of three questions: how do subjects manage to maintain an optimal 
epistemic position in their perceptual contact with the world? how do they exploit experience 
in their reason-giving practices? how do they manage to revise their beliefs in the light of 
experience?  
John McDowell and Bill Brewer, among others, have sketched a picture of perceptual content 
that is intended to elucidate these questions. Their picture is based on the hypothesis that 
perceptual awareness consists in a pre-doxastic actualization of conceptual abilities. Given its 
conceptual character, perceptual content would be easily integrated in belief systems and 
subjects would have direct access to it. Since these conditions are necessary for justification 
and belief revision to be possible, their picture would secure two necessary conditions of 
empirical rationality. 
In this paper I will argue that the conceptualist hypothesis is wrong. Positing a pre-doxastic 
actualization of concepts cannot solve these problems. I will rather argue that a doxastic 
account of experience provides a better model of first person accessibility. Before I reach this 
conclusion, it is necessary to introduce the conceptualist program.2 
I 
Conceptualists think that there is a legitimate idea of empirical rationality that characterizes 
human perceptual contact with the world. To count as knowers or epistemic subjects, it is not 
sufficient to be immediately related to the world or enjoy reliable perceptual mechanisms. It is 
also necessary to be bound by epistemic norms. In his critique of causal theories of 
perception, McDowell famously wrote: 
 
                                                
1 See Fred Dretske, “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic Duties?”, in: Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 60 (2000), pp. 591-606. 
2 I develop some of these points elsewhere. See “McDowell’s Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism”, in: 
European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) and “The Myth of the Conceptual Given” (under submission). 
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[P]erhaps this picture secures that we cannot be blamed for what happens at that outer boundary [of the 
space of reasons], and hence that we cannot be blamed for the inward influence of what happens there. 
What happens there is the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside the 
control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position 
we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a 
justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications.3  
 
McDowell’s sketchy remarks can be interpreted in different ways but the main idea is clear. 
Any account of perceptual experience should make room for a conception of humans as 
responsible agents. In other words, any theory should satisfy Quine’s idea that experience is a 
tribunal of beliefs or Sellars’s claim that empirical knowledge “is a self-correcting enterprise 
which can put any claim in jeopardy…”4 In less metaphorical terms, subjects of experience 
are rational to the extent that they are able to justify and revise their beliefs in the light of 
experience. 
Content conceptualism is based on the claim that, in order to make sense of experience as a 
tribunal (or as a self-correcting enterprise), we have to conceive of perceptual content as 
conceptual. This is apparent when McDowell urges “a different notion of givenness, one that 
is innocent of the confusion between justification and exculpation”.5 Since perceptions are 
passive, however, this proposal seems puzzling. Why should one claim that conceiving of 
perceptual content as conceptual is necessary to make room for epistemic responsibility? If I 
cannot decide how things ought to look in perception, but they merely look a particular way, 
how could content conceptualism make room for responsibility? If perceptions belong to the 
sorts of things that merely “happen” to us and there is nothing I can do to change the way 
things look, is it not a category mistake to reject a theory of perceptual content on the ground 
that it offers exculpations? 
Suppose I close my eyes and walk to the window of my room. When I arrive there, I open my 
eyes and begin to see things I did not foresee: I see a rainy day, my neighbor walking with his 
dog, and the postman arriving with the mail. In some sense my perceiving these contents is 
passive; even though it was my decision to walk to the window and open my eyes, their 
appearing happened to me in an involuntary way. If experiences are involuntary, we are faced 
with a problem: conceptual or non-conceptual, they are not the sorts of things to which the 
category of responsibility seems to apply. 
                                                
3 See John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 8. 
4 See Willard van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in his From a Logical Point of View 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 20-46; Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), § 38, p. 79.    
5 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 10. 
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These remarks suggest a different interpretation. The link between perceptual content and 
responsibility should be indirect. The contribution of conceptual contents in the whole project 
is not to explain epistemic responsibility directly but to provide necessary conditions thereof. 
I can think of two necessary conditions. 
The first condition can be formulated by contrasting conceptualism with a picture where there 
is a clear-cut difference between the content of perception and the content of judgment, as 
occurs in some versions of non-conceptual content or rough impressions. If these contents are 
totally different from the contents of beliefs, one is faced with what one could term the 
“integration problem.” If beliefs are conceptual states, introducing a non-conceptual “given” 
will create a gap between perceiving and believing. If there is a gap, it is hard to see how 
beliefs can be justified or revised in the light of experience. The defender of non-conceptual 
content is then led to introduce a transformation process by means of which non-conceptual 
contents become conceptual. If they were already conceptual, however, the gap would 
presumably disappear. Since justification and revision cannot take place if there is a gap, 
eliminating the gap is a necessary condition thereof.6   
Second, one could justify the hypothesis of perceptual content as conceptual by saying that it 
makes contents accessible to the subject. Given that one cannot rationally justify or revise a 
content one has no access to, that content must be accessible to the mind if it is to figure in 
these activities. Since concepts are usually endowed with the property of being accessible, 
describing perceptual content as conceptual would provide the second step in the program of 
conceiving experience as a tribunal. This reading can be sustained through the conceptualist 
idea that concepts are tied to the capacity of reflection and freedom.7 The idea of freedom 
suggests that humans can contemplate different alternatives and choose among different 
possible courses of action.8 One cannot, however, choose an alternative unless one has access 
to it. Hence, if one takes these alternatives as conceptually articulated, one will have satisfied 
a second condition of epistemic responsibility. 
II 
Conceptualists have provided two different versions of the claim that perceptual experiences 
are conceptually articulated. Both can be classified as pre-doxastic. According to them, we 
need a distinction between conscious perceptual states and belief states. In the former case, 
                                                
6 See Sonia Sedivy, “Nonconceptual Epicycles”, in: Christine van Geen and Frédérique de Vignemont (eds.) 
European Review of Philosophy 6 (2006), pp. 31-64. See also: J. McDowell, “Having the World in View: 
Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality”, in: Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), p. 462. 
7 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 47; Bill Brewer, Perception and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 118, 153, p. 164, etc. 
8 See J. McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism”, in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), pp. 171-172. 
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concepts are passively (or involuntarily) actualized. In the latter, they are part of cognitive 
attitudes like judgment or belief.  
Let us call the first version “propositional conceptualism.” According to this version, 
experiences present structured contents like those introduced by a “that”-clause preceded by a 
cognitive verb. In the transition from perception to belief, the subject “endorses” or “takes” 
these contents at face value. 
The second view can be called “intuitive conceptualism.” The main idea, which can be traced 
back to Kant, is that perception delivers contents that have a “formal unity.” Although these 
contents lack propositional structure of the form “a is F,” McDowell hypothesizes that they 
deliver concepts of proper and common sensibles. In the case of vision, they would include 
“postures such as perching and modes of locomotion such as hopping or flying.”9   
How do these conceptions of experience make room for epistemic responsibility? How do 
they help us to clarify the capacity to justify and correct our beliefs in the light of experience? 
In what follows, I shall criticize the motivations for a pre-doxastic form of awareness.  
Integration problem. As I pointed out before, the integration problem is particularly vivid 
for any picture of non-conceptual content. One might ask, however, whether one can solve it 
by endorsing a form of pre-doxastic conceptualism. The response is negative. 
The conceptualist claims that we have to conceive of perceptual contents as conceptually 
structured, as this would avoid the postulation of a cognitive transformation from a non-
conceptual content to a conceptual one. Such a move, however, only pushes the integration 
issue a little bit further, without solving it. After all, it is possible to distinguish between a 
time t1 when an item is not being highlighted and a time t2 when the same item comes to be 
singled out as the object of one’s selective attention. It seems natural to conceive of this 
transition as a conceptualization process: at t1 the subject was not actualizing any concept in 
relation to the relevant item, contrary to what happened when she directed her attention to the 
item at t2, and recognized it, say, as an F. If that’s right, this shows that the integration 
problem is a problem for any theory. 
This difficulty is even more vivid if one endorses a version of intuitive conceptualism. If one 
accepts McDowell’s idea that perceptual experience delivers contents of proper and common 
sensibles, the integration problem still asks for a solution. After all, justification and revision 
in the light of experience involve more specific concepts, like bird, canary, Pierre or dog. If 
one wants to explain the way a subject can justify or correct perceptual judgments involving 
these specific concepts, one still needs a transformation model. Hence, it is not by taking the 
                                                
9 See J. McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, in: Jakob Lindgaard (ed.) John McDowell: Experience, 
Norm, and Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 5. 
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content of perception as conceptually articulated that the problem will be solved. The level of 
conceptualization must also be capable of “rational interaction” with the concepts exercised in 
judgment and belief. 
Accessibility condition. The second argument for the conceptualist proposal was based on 
the intuitive connection between accessibility and responsibility. As far as I can see, it rests 
on the following assumption: 
A1. Responsibility-accessibility connection: I cannot be held responsible for what I have no 
reflective access to.   
In what follows, I shall try to show that we should weaken this assumption. Once we weaken 
it, however, the motivations for pre-doxastic conceptualism vanish. 
A1 owes its plausibility to a topographical metaphor: there is a line that separates what is 
accessible to us from what is not accessible to us. If something is absent from the territory one 
has access to, one cannot be held responsible for what occurs there. As McDowell tells us, he 
wants “an analogue to the sense in which if someone is found in a place from which she has 
been banished, she is exculpated by the fact that she was deposited there by a tornado. Her 
arriving there is completely removed from the domain of what she is responsible for.”10 
A moment’s reflection suggests that this assumption is not trivially true. What does count as 
part of the domain of what one is responsible for? Is that domain merely constituted by that to 
which one has direct or immediate access? Or does it also include that to which one has 
indirect or potential access? When one reads McDowell’s intuition in this weaker sense, pre-
doxastic conceptualism loses its intuitive force.   
Consider a case from practical reason. A man is at home watching TV while his 2-year-old 
nephew is playing in the park. Suppose his nephew has an accident during this time. Since the 
man has promised his sister to baby-sit, he can be held responsible for the accident, even 
though he has no direct access to what happened in the park. This example allows us to 
weaken the link between accessibility and responsibility. The man’s responsibility is related 
to the fact that he could have avoided the accident by surveying the child. To be sure, direct 
accessibility enables us to act accordingly, but one is not only responsible for what one has 
direct access to. On many occasions, one is also responsible for what one could have had 
access to. 
This weakening of the principle can be used against the conceptualist. Consider a picture of 
experience where subjects have no direct access to the pre-doxastic deliverances of perception 
but only enjoy reflective access to their perceptual beliefs. When the subject is concerned to 
                                                
10 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 8 fn 7. 
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evaluate her own experiences, she merely has access to her perceptual beliefs. There is no 
reason to think that this picture would preclude the ascription of responsibility to the subject. 
Even if she does not have direct access to the perceptual processes that mediate her access to 
the world, she can still adopt adequate policies to remain in an optimal epistemic position. 
She can attempt to remain under normal lighting conditions when she is judging the color of 
an object, or keep an adequate perspective when she is trying to identify an object. 
This point can be made vivid by reflecting on the following point: there are many unknown 
facts that mediate our relation to the world. Just think of the complex patterns of neuron firing 
that mediate our visual awareness. Despite our ignorance of such matters, their existence does 
not preclude our taking adequate epistemic policies. Now, since any picture has to rely on the 
obtaining of facts one is not acquainted with, there is some room for maneuver in drawing the 
accessible-inaccessible divide in a different way. There is no reason to assume that one should 
have direct access to the pre-doxastic content of perception (as opposed to the content of 
belief) in order to be held responsible for those contents. 
III 
I have been arguing that conceptualism is ill-motivated. Conceiving of the content of 
experience as conceptual is neither sufficient to solve the integration problem nor necessary to 
preserve the link between accessibility and responsibility. In this section, I will focus on the 
accessibility requirement and will argue that pre-doxastic conceptualism does not provide an 
adequate model thereof. 
We can illustrate the conceptualist strategy by focusing on the phenomenon of the persistence 
of illusion. In the Müller-Lyer figures, two lines appear to be of different length. If, however, 
a naïve subject were told that it is an optical illusion, he might be capable of withholding his 
previous judgment that one line is longer than the other. According to the conceptualist 
analysis, this capacity to withhold judging is easily explained in a pre-doxastic account of the 
content of experiences. Since perceiving is not mere believing, the subject is in principle free 
not to endorse the experiential contents presented in experience, even though, in ordinary 
contexts, he endorses them by default. His capacity to withhold judgment, however, depends 
on the fact that the contents he withholds are accessible to first person reflection. This is 
possible once you grant that the contents of experience are, albeit belief-independent, 
conceptually articulated.11 
As far as I can see, this analysis rests upon two assumptions: 
                                                
11 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 11 and fn 9. 
To appear in: G. W. Bertram, R. Celikates, C. Laudou & D. Lauer, eds., Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et 
de l’idéalisme (Collection « Ouverture philosophique »), Éditions L’Harmattan, Paris, 2010  
 7 
A2. Disconnection assumption: only a theory that dissociates perceptual awareness from 
judgment or belief can preserve epistemic responsibility. 
A3. Conceptual sufficiency: the actualization of conceptual capacities is sufficient to make 
perceptual contents accessible and, therefore, to motivate belief revision.  
Let us take a look at A2. Is it really necessary to dissociate perceptual awareness from belief 
in order to preserve epistemic responsibility? I do not think so. The case of the persistence of 
illusion is so construed that it does not justify the claim that experience is belief-independent. 
After all, the case is naturally described as an example of withholding judgment: someone 
who has already taken the two lines to be of different length can withhold (or suppress) her 
impulse to take them as being of different length.12 What is needed is not to disconnect belief 
states from perceptual experiences but to account for the subject’s capacity to control her 
disposition to take appearances at face value. As far as I know, however, the conceptualist has 
provided no explanation of this capacity. 
The case parallels the human capacity to fast or to go on a diet. When one is hungry, one is 
naturally disposed to eat. In order to explain the capacity to fast, we need an account of the 
mechanisms that allow people to control their disposition to eat. It would, however, be a 
mistake to factorize the state of being hungry into two components: a feeling of hunger and a 
disposition to eat. By parity of reasoning, it is a mistake to factorize perceptual awareness into 
a pre-doxastic conceptual state and an endorsement component just because humans are able 
to withhold their tendency to believe.   
Let us examine A3. Is the actualization of conceptual capacities sufficient to make perceptual 
contents accessible? To be sure, concepts are usually related to the notions of consciousness 
and first person access. That is why some people have introduced non-conceptual contents as 
serving sub-personal mechanisms.13 Nevertheless, one can ask what it means to have a pre-
doxastic access to the content of experience. In what follows, I will criticize the underlying 
picture.  
Here is my first argument: if you grant a version of intuitive conceptualism, it is not clear that 
the content it hypothesizes is really available to first person experience. After all, the idea that 
perceptual experiences deliver concepts of proper and common sensibles must be seen as a 
theoretical hypothesis, not as a description of the way we experience the world. To illustrate 
                                                
12 See George Pitcher, A Theory of Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and, more recently, 
A. D. Smith, “Perception and Belief”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001), pp. 283-309. 
13 See José Luis Bermúdez, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). Not all 
philosophers accept this analysis. Peacocke takes it that non-conceptual content is accessible. See Christopher 
Peacocke, “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, in: Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 239-
264. 
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the point, imagine you ask people in the street what they see. They would probably mention 
chairs, mountains, lakes, animals, etc. They would not, however, mention concepts of proper 
or common sensibles. Now, if you suspect that people do not know what appears to them, try 
to ask a philosopher of perception. Moore and Russell would tell you that we see sense data 
and, some years ago, McDowell would have replied that we see facts. It would be odd to 
claim that they are only aware of concepts of proper and common sensibles, and that they still 
do not know of what they are aware.  
My second argument is more general. It is contentious to assume that our access to perceptual 
contents can be wholly explained in terms of the actualization of concepts. Actually, if one is 
interested in explaining first person access, one also has to clarify the attitudes involved. A 
moment’s reflection suggests that these attitudes are very much like doxastic attitudes. Let us 
consider one of the main epistemic uses of accessibility: its role in the critical evaluation of 
mental states. 
One might be tempted to compare the critical evaluation of ideas to a visual scene: we write 
the ideas on a piece of paper and compare them with each other. With this metaphor in mind, 
one may be inclined to think that there is something that makes percepts open to scrutiny. 
Perhaps one thinks of concepts as lenses one uses when examining a given item. If I do not 
wear those lenses, the items remain inaccessible to me; but, if I wear them, they are disclosed 
to me.  
Nonetheless, one might argue that this model of accessibility has a flavor of the Given. After 
all, scrutinizing one’s ideas is an epistemic activity that involves judgment. Suppose that I 
plan to go on vacation. Before going to the airport, I have to solve a number of tasks. In order 
not to forget anything, I write down everything on a sheet of paper: (1) close the windows; (2) 
turn the alarm on; (3) hand the keys to the janitor, etc. The rational process of checking the 
things I have already done would probably consist in putting a cross in front of the performed 
task. Checking ‘1’ would be similar to asserting “I already closed the windows.” Although 
perception is involved, examining the list is not something “given” by perception, but requires 
that I keep track of the tasks I have already performed and those still pending. In this model, it 
is by acting in a particular way that I can examine the different things. Even if one grants that 
having a concept is similar to wearing an appropriate lens, the crucial point is that using it 
involves operations that are hard to sever from those of judging.        
When one considers this analogy in the light of the problem of epistemic responsibility, it 
appears plausible. Suppose that you are requested to examine a logical proof of a theorem and 
decide whether it follows from the axioms. Simply observing the sequence of lines will not 
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do. You need to check whether each line contains a well-formed formula and follows from the 
axioms. Consequently, you have to accept the previous theorems (at least for the sake of the 
argument). In order to deduce q from p ∧ q you have to judge (or suppose) that p ∧ q. In this 
model, examination is a complex activity constituted by doings. That is why a subject can be 
held responsible for her verdict on the validity of the proof. 
The trouble with a pre-doxastic model is that it is difficult to see how concepts themselves can 
provide the subject with a responsible access to perceptual intake. Either one thinks of access 
by means of a perceptual model or one posits a new psychological process that does not rely 
on judgment. Since conceptualists have not explained what a pre-judgmental access to content 
is, we are left with an imagery reminiscent of the Given. There is a conceptual Given that has 
the magic property of “opening our eyes” to the layout of reality. 
The dialectic strategy should be clear. I have been trying to explain how the idea of pre-
doxastic actualizations of concepts could account for epistemic responsibility. I have argued 
that conceiving of concepts as actualized in perceptual experience is not sufficient to solve the 
integration problem, and it provides an inadequate model of accessibility. In the final section, 
I sketch an alternative picture of experience that fares better with these objections. 
IV 
In my view, ordinary experience can be seen as a form of believing. Contrary to classical 
versions of the doxastic theory, however, my view is not that experience can be analyzed or 
reduced to the acquisition of beliefs. The claim is subtler. As I see them, perceptual processes 
occur unconsciously. These processes can have non-conceptual contents of the sorts studied 
by cognitive science but these contents are functionally connected to other processes in the 
biological (not functionalist) sense of the term. In some cases, these processes can give rise to 
reflexes, as when a ball is coming at you and you automatically duck your head. In other 
cases, perceptual processes can guide action without producing an adequate feeling of 
presence. This is usually the case with those blind-sighted patients who display fine-tuned 
grasping abilities in the absence of the phenomenology characteristic of ordinary experience. 
In other cases, perceptual processes are functionally related to belief states. Fixating belief is 
the paradigmatic way in which perceptual processes give rise to perceptual awareness, and it 
is also the way in which they fulfill their epistemic function. This captures Davidson’s claim 
that perceptual awareness is just another belief.14 Perceptual beliefs can be introduced as 
reasons for other beliefs but they are not rationally or evidentially based. Instead, they are 
functionally linked to lower level perceptual processes. 
                                                
14 See Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in his Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 142. 
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Since this is a teleological analysis, it entails that, only under normal circumstances, subjects 
believe what they see. As a result, it would be wrong to reject it by arguing that some 
experiences do not lead to belief. This line of reply would be mistaken, since functions can 
fail to be fulfilled. A thermometer can fail to indicate the temperature and an unhealthy heart 
can fail to pump blood. It remains uncontroversial, however, that the function of 
thermometers is to indicate the temperature and that of hearts is to pump blood. These 
examples show that human perception-belief transitions are normative. When perceptual 
processes work properly, the subject is led to form appropriate beliefs.15 
This model can be extended to the persistence of illusion. Although the proper function of 
perceptual processes is to give rise to perceptual belief, it is not necessary that all perceptual 
processes end up with endorsement. In this perspective, well-known perceptual illusions are 
examples of malfunctioning in a broad sense. To be sure, when one line looks longer than the 
other in the Müller-Lyer illusion, there is a sense in which one’s perceptual system is not 
damaged but is working properly but there is also a sense in which the context of belief 
fixation is abnormal. Whenever there is a withholding of judgment, it is owed to the presence 
of a background belief that blocks the normal belief formation process. It is, however, 
arguable that perceptual systems acquired the functions they have in contexts in which such 
undermining reasons were absent. If those mechanisms were selected to help organisms to 
acquire knowledge from their environment, the most “natural” solution would be to connect 
these perceptual mechanisms directly to endorsement. From this perspective, it always takes a 
second thought to withhold a perceptual belief.  
In the present case, it is this doxastic level that is crucial for making sense of the epistemic 
role of experience. Perceptual experience is entitling only when there are no reasons to cast 
doubt on it. In the absence of reasons to wonder whether the two lines are of the same length, 
a naïve subject is entitled to believe that they are of the same length. On this account, “being 
entitled to p”  is not factive. It is a defeasible state. Being in that state would allow the subject 
to be exculpated if he were wrong.16 
This model, however, also provides some keys to incorporate epistemic responsibility. In 
what follows, I will mention some intuitive requirements of epistemic justification and 
revision, and will explain how the present model accommodates them. 
Transparency: the first requirement is that perceptual experience should be conceived as 
transparent and not as an epistemic intermediary between mind and world. It is only because 
                                                
15 In future research, I intend to provide an analysis of what might count as “appropriate” perceptual beliefs.  
16 For a factive analysis of entitlement, see Tyler Burge, “Perceptual Entitlement”, in: Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research 68 (2003), pp. 503-548. 
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one takes experience to reveal objective features of the world that it is reasonable to justify or 
revise one’s beliefs in the light of experience. Now, some people have thought that beliefs are 
like inner representations. In his discussion of Davidson’s proposal, McDowell assumes that 
beliefs are like “subjective things” that “belong together with evolving world-views,” as 
opposed to the world outside.17 Similarly, some people assume that taking beliefs as the 
minimal units of justification would make our relation to the world indirect. A familiar line of 
objection points out that, if beliefs are the minimal units of justification, we will need a 
second-order premise to the effect that the belief is reliably based. Since this premise cannot 
be delivered by perceptual experience, this strategy would undermine the rational role of 
perceptual experience.18 
But this idea strikes me as implausible. To be sure, when one is interested in making one’s 
beliefs explicit, one can assert “I believe that it is raining.” It is not necessary, however, that, 
in order to believe that p, I entertain an explicit representation of the form I believe that p. 
This would mean that, for an organism to believe something, it would have to have the 
concept of belief. But this assumption is absurd. Compare the case with other examples: 
infants usually feel hungry, although they have no concept of hunger. Why should belief be 
different? When we claim that paradigmatic forms of experience carry doxastic force, we are 
merely stressing that subjects treat their contents as holding and are prone to act as if these 
contents were true. 
If belief is not explicitly articulated in the context of normal experience, subjects are not 
expected to add a second-order premise. As a result, we are in a position to see that beliefs 
actually support the claim of transparency. To begin with, if normal experience is a form of 
believing, normal experience does not rest on epistemic intermediaries. When I see a visual 
scene, there is no distance between my experiencing the world in a particular way and my 
taking it to be a particular way. My experiencing it to be a particular way is my taking it to be 
a particular way. This lack of distance explains why the skeptical question “should I trust my 
senses?” does not arise from the bare consideration of normal experiences. For this question 
to arise, we would need a two-step story or a communication chain where experience contains 
a message that may be taken or refused. But, from our first person perspective, the senses do 
not give us any message. It is simply impossible to weight their rational credentials because 
they do not provide us with anything that can be weighted. As Dretske writes: “We have no 
choice about what to believe when we see (hear, smell, feel, etc.) that things are thus and so. 
                                                
17 See J. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 144. 
18 See B. Brewer, Perception and Reason, p. 184, p. 219. 
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We experience and forthwith believe. Between the experience and the belief there isn’t time 
to weigh evidence.”19 Contrary to Dretske, however, it is not because of lack of time that 
subjects do not weight perceptual evidence. In the present account, this is owed to the fact that 
perceptual evidence already has doxastic force. 
This idea gains further support from Evans’s attractive claim that belief is transparent. In a 
well-known passage he wrote: 
 
[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed 
outward—upon the world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I 
must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were 
answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ I get myself in a position to answer the 
question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the 
question whether p.20  
 
If belief is transparent, there is no danger in Davidson’s claim that nothing can count as a 
reason for holding a belief, except another belief. If we hold this view, we are not committed 
to conceive of our mental states as silhouettes in a camera obscura isolated from the world. 
Passivity: conceptualists have introduced the idea of a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts 
motivated by the idea that concepts operate in an involuntary way. Belief-fixation, however, 
is also passive. That is why philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have insisted: 
“belief is a certitude in which we find ourselves without knowing how or where we entered 
into it.”21 This is particularly vivid when one realizes that beliefs are also things that happen 
to us. We “undergo” our beliefs. In this sense, the conceptualist is mistaken when he thinks 
that, in order to get passivity, one has to posit a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts.  
The defender of the doxastic account can support this idea by introducing Sellars’s distinction 
between actions and acts. In Sellars’s view, deliberating, turning one’s attention to a problem, 
or searching one’s memory are mental actions. They are the sorts of things one can decide to 
do. Mental actions, however, are done by performing more basic mental acts. The doxastic 
theorist can incorporate this idea by claiming that perceptual beliefs are mental acts in the 
sense that they are not the sorts of things one can decide to do.22 They are, instead, means by 
which we engage in epistemic activities. Withholding a perceptual belief, by contrast, might 
eventually involve mental actions. In order to withhold judging that p, one has to weight 
                                                
19 See F. Dretske, “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic Duties?”, p. 598. 
20 See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 225. 
21 See Kevin Mulligan, “Certainty, Soil and Sediment”, in: Mark Textor (ed.) The Austrian Contribution to 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2006). 
22 See W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations in Kantian Themes (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), 
p. 74. 
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evidence for not-p: one’s previous belief that one line is longer than the other and the new 
claim that they are of the same length, since it is an illusion. In this model, the subject is 
presented with two doxastic alternatives, not with a pre-doxastic content that she can take or 
leave. If this is right, conceptualism reveals itself to be the result of a poor ontology of 
spontaneity, where the latter is seen as consisting uniquely of mental actions. 
Negation: for a subject to be able to withhold a judgment, her belief system should have the 
means of representing negative contents and be governed by the law of non-contradiction. 
Suppose that a naïve subject were presented with the Müller-Lyer figures. If asked, he could 
report, “One line is longer than the other.” After being informed that they are of the same 
length, it would be necessary that he incorporates the assertion in such a way that it stands in 
opposition to his old belief. In other words, he must be able to use it in the service of negating 
the former belief: “One line is not longer than the other” or “It is not the case that one line is 
longer than the other.”  
Crucially, negative contents are not “given” in experience. At best, experience tells us that 
things are so and so, but it does not tell us that they are not so and so. As Millikan observes, 
negative judgments are not reached by the absence of stimulation but by one’s sensitivity to 
the fact, if it is a fact, that different predicates stand as complements or contraries of other 
predicates: “Not observing that the apple is red does not equal observing that it is not red. To 
tell that it is not red I must be able to tell what other color it is instead, that it is some contrary 
of red or, more generally, that it is non-red, the complement of red.”23 
From these remarks it is possible to argue that negative contents presuppose subjective 
doings. This is something that the doxastic approach can accommodate, given its emphasis on 
the mind’s attitude towards contents. In order to see that two predicates are incompatible, the 
cognitive system has to compare them in some respect. As a result, all the materials for belief 
revision are not directly “given”. One is presented, in the best case, with a judgment like 
“that’s blue,” but one can exploit that judgment as a reason to withhold one’s previous 
judgment “that’s red” only if one takes it that blue stands in opposition to red. One cannot be 
moved to eliminate a prior judgment unless one has considered the item denoted by “that” in 
the same respect. After all, one and the same object can be both blue and red if the colors are 
distributed in different areas. 
Reason-giving practices: from a pre-theoretical viewpoint, a reason is an intersubjective 
notion, i.e. a notion that fits better in the contexts of inquiry or discussion. McDowell stresses 
this point in a number of texts. In his “Two Sorts of Naturalism”, he paraphrases the space of 
                                                
23 See Ruth Garrett Millikan, On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay on Substance Concepts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 106. 
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reasons as the space of logos. In the “Afterword” to Mind and World, he protests that a non-
conceptualist like Peacocke cannot respect that link: “In the reflective tradition we belong to, 
there is a time-honoured connection between reason and discourse […]. Reasons that the 
subject can give, in so far as they are attributable, must be within the space of concepts.”24 
McDowell is wrong, however, if he thinks that a conceptualist view of reasons can respect 
this connection. The reasons one articulates in logos are assertive ones, not pre-doxastic ones. 
In the context of a discussion, one never voices a pre-doxastic perceptual reason. Still, one 
never gives justifications in terms of proper and common sensibles. In contrast, if one accepts 
the traditional analysis of assertion as the expression of belief, this connection can be easily 
accommodated in the doxastic approach. Whenever I give a perceptual reason, I express a 
belief. 
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Abstract: Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper of 
responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this 
capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I 
conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves 
open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is 
fulfilled by perceptual beliefs. I develop this claim by showing that the doxastic account satisfies a series of 
intuitive requirements of justification and belief revision. 
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